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Ashikaga line or unrelated magnates. Their lands were widely scattered, both within and outside their province of appointment, and in most cases the holdings outside the province were the more extensive. To take a single example, in the sixth decade of the fourteenth century, the shugo of northern Ōmi, the Kyōgoku, held jito rights to six domains in the province, but the bulk of Kyōgoku holdings were scattered throughout distant provinces. Their holdings in Ōmi, though considerable, were but a small fraction of the domains located there. In another more extreme example, Kō no Morohide, the shugo of Yamashiro during the Ōei era (1394–1398), held domains located mostly in the Kantō and Tōkai regions; not a single one was located in Yamashiro, his appointed province. 3

Most shugo land tenures were defined in terms of shiki (rights), typically jitorichi or ryōke-shiki in some shō or gō, although these shiki had already ceased to be what they had been in earlier ages. Shiki in the Muromachi period were not part of the vertical hierarchy of rights (i.e., honke-shiki, ryōke-shiki, azukaridokoro-shiki, and jitorichi), all affecting the same parcel of land, a condition which was typical of Kamakura period land tenure. Rather, each of these shiki represented an independent holding, a domain existing side by side with other domains. 4 This general state of affairs had come about during the period of the wars of the Northern and Southern Courts with the deterioration of the shōen system. As the structure of vertically stratified tenures broke down, a shiki-holder within a shō or gō generally came to enjoy complete proprietary control over his jitorichi or ryōke, free from superior tenures.

With holdings so widely scattered, how did the shugo exercise control over his several domains? Usually, he did so through his position as chief heir, or sōryō, which allowed him to act as head of an extended lineage. Shugo control over its cadet families, who were often local lords with their own holdings, was exercised through an inheritance system in which the sōryō was invested with the ultimate authority over family properties in their entirety. As head of the main lineage, the shugo generally controlled domains by appointing them to kinsmen or by appointing kinsmen as estate managers. Within the shugo’s own province, however, the sōryō system of control could not be very effective because the holdings so held were limited. As time passed, moreover, this control system gradually deteriorated as cadet branches became autonomous kokujin lords. This trend was especially pronounced when the branch family’s holdings were distant from the shugo’s province.

No shugo held more than a small fraction of the sum total of domains within his province of assignment, and it cannot be thought that he held the province as a proprietary lordship. On the contrary, the provinces controlled by the shugo consisted of small scattered domains under the proprietors of kokujin. To put it another way, kokujin, including shugo cadets, who regarded the land as their own and extracted dues from its cultivators, represented the general type of proprietary lordship at this time. Looked at in this way the shugo within his province was himself one of the local kokujin.

Because kokujin lordship was the basis of local power, the shugo worked to expand his control of holdings in his province, thereby increasing his ability to control shōen proprietors and local kokujin from above. To accomplish this the shugo had certain advantages. Using the public backing of the bakufu, shugo were able to extend their proprietorships and link them into a system of political alliances within their provinces.

In theory, shugo were local officials appointed to each province as part of the national public administration. As the Kemmu shikimoku of 1336 states in Article 7: “The office of shugo has from ancient times been an office of public administration.” 5 Initially, the shugo’s public authority was limited to “the three great constabulary duties”: the muster of capital guardsmen and jurisdiction over cases of treason and homicide. Gradually the shugo acquired more extensive powers from the bakufu, including the power to execute judgments in cases regarding land or domains, to arrest and punish those accused of unlawful harvesting, and to administer hanzei, a system whereby half of the income from certain estates was expropriated for military purposes. Another power, acquired through the bakufu from the imperial court, was the authority to collect tansen, which was originally an extraordinary levy measured in cash (sen) and imposed uniformly throughout each province on each tan (about one-third of an acre) of “public land.” 6 In exchange for assuming the burden of collecting this tax, the shugo by the middle of the fifteenth century had asserted the right to levy shugo tansen and shugo corvée in recompense for services as occasion demanded. 6

Thus by expanding and intensifying his public administrative authority, the shugo expanded his control over his province as one component of the nationwide authority exercised by the bakufu. As such his position con-

tained certain elements of political imperium as well as of personal vassalage. Within the provincial structure the shugo's authority was of course lesser in scope than the bakufu's, and the power of the shugo over his province had its limits. For example, certain shōen were by bakufu order immune from entry by the shugo of the province or his agents.

Although as a part of the nationwide authority structure the shugo gained the means of exerting considerable influence over his province of appointment, the authority which the shugo derived from the bakufu did not directly affect the area of proprietary lordship. This authority consequently cannot be viewed as feudal or proprietary. But it could become the means for preserving or expanding feudal domains. There remains, then, the question of how the shugo utilized his political and military authority to expand his proprietary holdings.

The shugo had the power to make awards of hanzei rights and used this power to make grants to his own dependent vassals. When the apparatus of the old imperial provincial office, and control of provincial domains (kokugarya) along with it, fell into the shugo's hands, the accompanying lands could be granted to dependent vassals. Shōen sometimes fell under shugo receivership (shugo-uke), an arrangement in which the shugo took complete charge of the domain, promising the former proprietor a guaranteed annual payment. Such shōen in fact became the de facto domains of the shugo, who could appoint his vassal as deputy (daikan) to take control of them. All these methods were used by shugo to expand their domains in their provinces. The network of control extended by these means was to some extent feudal, since grants of domains in exchange for oaths of loyalty were the medium within which it operated.

The strength of the shugo's proprietary lordship powers over his province may be evaluated by considering the territorial extent of shugo domains in the province and the strength of the bond established between the shugo and his dependent vassals. In the first instance, the shugo strove to convert kokujin into dependent vassals by assigning them hanzei grants or lands seized from old provincial domains.7 The extent to which this was accomplished within the shugo's province varied and is not readily ascertainable. That no province was organized as a “domain” through such means is suggested by the survival of shugo-immune shōen into the next century and the promptness with which shugo provinces generally fell apart after the Ōnin War. In no case did a shugo manage to reduce his entire province to the status of personal domain through the process of expanding his private holdings within it.


Nor was the shugo immediately successful in his attempt to reduce the kokujin to a condition of total vassalage. His relationship with local kokujin remained extremely loose. The more stable bond as between lord and retainer was yet to be widely attained. For example, the Yamana uprising of 1391, and later shugo rebellions against the bakufu, were swiftly put down because the shugo's retainers defected so readily. The weakness of the vassalage bond was due partly to the fact that the subordinate relationship was imposed on kokujin at the initiative of the shugo, and the kokujin was constrained to accept it against his will. This weakness also resulted from the fact that the kokujin who became vassals were attempting above all to preserve and expand their own proprietary holdings. And it was these holdings that must be recognized and examined as constituting the most fundamental feature of Muromachi local governance, namely, the kokujin lordship system.

THE KOKUJIN LORDSHIP SYSTEM

The terms kokujin (lit., a provincial) and kuniushi (the provincials) became current in the middle of the fourteenth century when the war between the Northern and Southern Courts was at its height. They were general designations for local military stewards (jūō) or peasant leaders (doge) used to distinguish these local leaders from the shugo and his retainers who had newly arrived in their province. But although both proprietary lords and village leaders were indiscriminately called kokujin, their modes of existence were strikingly different.8 The village chief was an economically independent villager, but his political status depended on his role as a leader and representative of the village council and other peasant associations. By contrast, the proprietary lord (ryōshū), though he too might live in the village, had ceased to participate directly in rural management. Being a lord, he was not included in rural associations, and his status depended on his power to control, and extract dues from, the peasantry. It is of course this latter group who are called kokujin or kokujin lords for the present discussion.

Some kokujin lords emerged from among the doge during the wars of the early Muromachi period, but most were the successors of Kamakura period jūō. In the Kinai region kokujin were usually militarily weak and their domains small.9 The domains of the kokujin lords of the Muromachi period differed significantly from those of the Kamakura jūō. It had been typical of their predecessors to have holdings scattered widely over several

The Kobayakawa of Aki (mentioned by Professor Kawai) are an example of a kokuji house which very early developed a proprietary domain by this method. In Numata no shinjō, one of the Kobayakawa kitu holdings, the jitō shares (i.e., stipendiary fields) were located in the villages of Kuranashi, Oda, Nashi, Ōkasa, Yoshina, Tanami, Kamiyama, Nora, Kusai, and Takasagi no ura. These jitō lands were assigned on a village basis to different cadet branches of the Kobayakawa line, and the cadet families settled in these villages and assumed their names. We soon hear of the Kuranashi family, the Oda family, the Ōkusa family, the Kamiyama family, and the Nora family which, although branch families of the Kobayakawa, were also members of the villages where they managed part of their holdings personally and let out the rest to the peasants as myōshushiki or saku-shiki. By virtue of their original nonpeasant status, they emerged as leaders of their village communities. They became, in other words, dogō. The Kobayakawa soryō line, acting as leader of these branches, discharged duties owed to the bakufu and dealt directly with the shugo and other kokujin. The soryō line controlled the villages of its domain through its branch houses, and it worked to expand its domains by acquiring shiki titles within the shōen system such as general inspector (sōkengō-shiki), clerk (kemon-shiki), and constable (sōinbushiki-shiki), all of which gave them additional stipendiary lands. They also expanded their holdings through vigorous land reclamation projects.

The kokujin class, as it developed its means of control at the local level, withdrew from personal involvement in agriculture and increasingly relied on the work of individual peasant cultivators. As the kokujin secured their control of the external conditions needed for agricultural production, such as forests, undeveloped grasslands, water rights, flood control systems, and market and transportation facilities, they were further able to strengthen their grip on the peasantry. The indispensability of water to the prevailing wet-rice agriculture needs no special explanation. Forests and open fields were sources of supply for fuel and fertilizer needed for rural production, and markets provided goods, especially iron tools and salt, that were absolute necessities of life and production for the peasantry. It is only natural that kokujin lords exerted themselves to acquire control over these facilities.

Controversies over water or open fields between kokujin or between soryō and cadet families were frequent and were caused by the kokujin lord’s attempt to acquire forests, water rights, and other requisites to his control of his domain. Facilities of this broad type were always bequeathed from soryō to soryō as the family’s main inheritance. In the testaments of
kokujin there is frequent mention not only of arable fields but also of forests, meadows, irrigation water, and markets. In the case of the Kobayakawa family, we find that, whereas the domains of cadet families were mainly wet or dry rice fields, the sōryō’s domain, in addition to such fields, included Numata marketplace. In the case of the Sakai family, kokujin of Taki-gun in Tamba, there remains a family settlement agreement in which the arable fields were distributed in roughly equal quantity to the next sōryō, his younger brother, and his half brothers, but moun-
tains, forests, and watercourses were to be controlled by the sōryō. The sōryō allowed the other heirs to use these other rights and properties, but only in proportion to the amount of field held. The usufruct rights in uncultivated territories, irrigation water, and markets assured the cadet houses of leadership in their villages. Because these rights were controlled by the sōryō house, the kokujin lord controlled the villages and, thereby, advanced its lordship.

The branch houses which established themselves as peasant chiefs and village leaders under the sōryō system were not always receptive to the control of the sōryō house, tending gradually to become independent of sōryō control. Some branch families such as the Kuranashi of Numata no shinjō, a branch of the Kobayakawa, gained their independence, became lords in their own right, expanded their domains, produced cadet houses of their own, and, as a “great cadet family,” rivaled the sōryō house. As the system of domainal control based on the sōryō institution slowly weakened, the leadership authority of the sōryō over his lineage group often passed to household chiefs (katoku) of each of the cadet branches, leading to a fragmentation of the older kinship organization.

To counter this tendency of cadet branches to pull away from the main line, sōryō houses resorted to a number of devices, the most notable one being abandonment of the practice of divided inheritances. Increasingly, sōryō houses, while appealing to their branches for kinship solidarity, replaced the customary divided inheritance with unigeniture through the sōryō line. With the institution of sōryō unigeniture, it became impossible for second sons to establish independent branch families, and most of them accepted support from the sōryō or katoku (i.e., household chief) in exchange for personal services. In this way, they and their descendants became the katoku’s household retainers, or vassals. The testament of the kokujin Kobayakawa Shigeyoshi states, “The aforesaid domains I bequeath to my son Yoshiharu, in unrestricted possession, directing him to support his younger brother Yagoro.” Likewise, Kobayakawa Naka-


yoshi’s testament of 1398 states, “My domains I bequeath to the household chief Hirokage, and I direct my later sons Harukage, Tarōsaburō, and Shōjumaru to render service as household retainers, ever obedient to Hirokage’s commands.” The conversion of second sons into household retainers created the basis for the formation of a feudal hierarchy within the kokujin lordship system.

In the branch houses established prior to the change to unigenital succession, the same practices appeared. Unigenital household chiefs were established, and cadets were required to become their retainers. There was, nonetheless, an important difference. Because the heads of branch families had not yet attained complete political or economic independence, they had to cope with a number of difficult problems: the opposition of shōen proprietors, competition with other kokujin over vacant tracts and water resources, and, above all, the problem of retaining control over their own cadet branches, dependent vassals, peasant chiefs, and peasant associations. The countermeasure most appropriate to the preservation of smaller establishments faced with these problems was the formation of leagues or ikki. The alternative was to become the dependent vassal of a shugo or the client of a stronger sōryō house.

The kokujin ikki, as described by Professor Kawai in the previous essay, was a league of small- to medium-sized kokujin united by common interests. In it all members agreed to act in unison, in accordance with the articles of a sworn covenant. In Aki, for instance, the Akimitsu, Kamiyama, Oda, and Ōkuasa houses, all cadet branches of the Kobayakawa family that had become independent kokujin, entered into ikki covenants on three separate occasions—in 1431, 1442, and 1451.16 This type of kokujin ikki appeared in every region and represented a general trend of the times. Some examples are the “Mōri Lineage Assembly” of Aki, the “Suda League” of Kii, the “Seven Chiefs of Takashima” of Ōmi, the “Yōboku Band” of Echigo, and the “Matsuruba League” of Hizen. Participants in these ikki included nonkindred as well as kindred houses, territory being a stronger basis of affiliation than kinship. The change from the sōryō system to the kokujin ikki may therefore be seen as a movement from kinship to territoriality as a basis of political organization. The purposes of the ikki, as revealed by the written covenants, included mutual guarantees of independence in resistance both to sōryō control and to pressure from the shugo to become vassals or pay tansu taxes. In addition, an important objective of these leagues was to

combat rebellious tendencies among cadets, dependent vassals, peasant chiefs, and the peasant class beneath them. The oath of the Ythoku Band, for instance, included reference to "the rebellious members of one another's households," and the ikki of Kobayakawa cadets referred to "the cadets and dependent vassals of our households" and declared "that the family chief will maintain individually his kindred of other houses."

We may conclude, then, that the kokujin ikki was a form of countermeasure taken by the kokujin in defense of their lordships, corresponding to the shōke ikki or leagues of village communities. The ikki itself was a limited form of political organization. Its main purpose was to preserve the status quo; it had no potential for the formation of a more extensive feudal hierarchy. This limitation was not to be overcome until the appearance of the sengoku-daimyō.

When a kokujin became a vassal of the shugo it was, as we have seen, at the shugo's insistence. As a consequence, the bond between shugo and vassal was so unstable that at the slightest change in the shugo's fortunes the vassal would desert him. Also contributing to the fragility of the bond between shugo and vassals was the fact that kokujin lords usually became shugo vassals only as a means of preserving or expanding their own lordships. Moreover there were other alternatives to vassalage to the shugo for the small or medium kokujin lord, for he could attach himself as a dependent to a more powerful sōryō house.

Significantly, when a small kokujin became dependent on a more powerful sōryō house, this did not lead to a revival of the sōryō system but to a system of nonfamilistic feudal vassalage. When protection was requested of a powerful regional figure by an independent kokujin lord, this protection naturally had its price. For example, the Oda family of the Kobayakawa lineage, in order to resist the illegal occupation of their lands by the Hiraga and to obtain confirmation of their title, requested protection of the Kobayakawa sōryō in Numata. In return they presented to the Kobayakawa chief their domains of one-half of Tamari village. Eventually, this price would take the form of vassalage on a strictly feudal basis, but this practice became universal only at a later state of development with the appearance of the sengoku-daimyō.

It is essential to bear in mind the importance of the institution of kokujin lordship within the total political system of the Muromachi period. For, although we tend to emphasize the relationship between bakufu and shugo as the backbone of the Muromachi political order, kokujin lordship was the fundamental institution upon which that order rested. To be sure,

the bakufu frequently came to the aid of shōen proprietors, prohibiting illegal invasion and occupation of shōen lands by kokujin. Also through the shugo it compelled kokujin to pay tansen and similar taxes. But such acts were not a denial of the kokujin lordship system; kokujin lords were given the same recognition and protection as shōen lords. When the shugo sought to reduce the kokujin to vassalage, collecting tansen from them or enforcing bakufu orders against them, this too was not a denial of kokujin lordship. Rather the shugo in such instances were carrying out their national administrative duties and were only secondarily attempting to expand their personal power. The shugo deputy (shugodai) system, too, was merely kokujin lordship in disguised form. In fact, the enforcement of hanzei and the designation of deputys, actually a kind of kokujin trusteeship, was a positive contribution to the expansion of kokujin lordships. Thus the bakufu, or the bakufu-shugo structure, must be seen as the guarantor of kokujin lordship at the local level.

An especially important link between the bakufu and kokujin lords was the confirmation of domains. From the very beginning the bakufu had held the right to confirm the domains of shugo, shogunal vassals, and jito. By the early fifteenth century it had extended this power to include temples, shrines, nobles, and all kokujin, whether shogunal vassals or not. In doing this the bakufu had ignored the old distinction between immune shōen and the provincial domain (kokugaryō), most probably in the belief that all domains were in the last analysis public and therefore belonged ultimately to the holder of supreme proprietary power, that is, itself. But, however that may be, these broad powers of confirmation, which far exceeded those held by the Kamakura bakufu, were extremely important. To the extent that it was able to serve as the ultimate legal power in the confirmation of domains, the Muromachi bakufu as the national sovereign headed a feudal hierarchy comprising itself and the shugo, kokujin, temples, shrines, and nobles whose lands it confirmed. In principle, one might say, an early form of feudal monarchy had been created.

Of all the types of proprietary lords organized into this hierarchy, it must be emphasized, the central position was occupied not by the shugo, the religious institutions, or the nobility but, rather, by the kokujin. Thus it was essential for the bakufu, while establishing shugo as its prime agents

17. Ibid.
over the provinces, to extend into these provinces its right of direct land confirmation. The Muromachi bakufu, in sum, erected through its powers of confirmation over domains a power structure based on the kokujin lordship system which underlay the more nationally visible bakufu-shugo power structure. It was for this reason that the shugo were never able to convert their provinces of assignment into their own “provincial domains.”

THE PROVINCIAL DOMAIN SYSTEM
OF THE SENGOKU-DAIMYO

The system of independent kokujin lordships began to decline in the latter half of the fifteenth century. The year 1428 marked a high point in the proliferation of doski, peasant leagues led by those very rural chiefs, the dogo, on whom the kokujin relied for control over the villages. As a result of these leagues, and the numerous uprisings to which they gave birth, the kokujin came into direct confrontation with the dogo. Worsening conflicts, acting as a primer charge on internal dissension in the shogunal and shugo houses, set off a nationwide explosion. The Ōnin War which broke out in 1467 was a prime result. But the conflict was more widespread and deeply rooted than that revealed in the fighting in Kyoto. The disturbances of Ōnin signaled the destruction of the entire set of interrelated institutions which had supported the Muromachi regime: kokujin lordship, the remnants of the shōen system, and the bakufu-shugo structure.

Under pressure from the peasants led by the dogo, the kokujin frequently failed to retain their local authority and were compelled to relinquish to the dogo their control of forests, vacant fields, water, and the like, as well as to recognize peasant contracts (hyakushō uke) over the fields which comprised their domains (see the following essay). In their attempts to preserve their domains, weaker kokujin sought protection from the stronger, and eventually became their vassals.20 The basic trend was toward the gradual disappearance of the independent kokujin lordship and the formation of hierarchical feudal relationships between the more powerful kokujin, the future sengoku-daimyo.

As described by Professor Kawai in the previous essay, the powerful kokujin who became sengoku-daimyo could come from many different backgrounds. They might be strong ősōhō houses whose cadets had requested protection and been made into vassals, politically powerful men who had been relied upon as arbitrators in disputes between kokujin, or kokujin ikki members who had gradually come forward as outstanding leaders and protectors of the league. By virtue of their superior power in the midst of continuous warfare and disorder, such men seized the right to confirm domains that had been the bakufu’s prerogative. Exercising the power to confirm the domains of small and medium kokujin lords seeking aid, arbitration, or protection, these powerful figures demanded vassalage in return for protection, and thereby raised themselves to the status of regional lord. As the result of this new process of confirmation, a feudal hierarchical relationship was formed that was considerably stronger than the precarious tie between the shugo and his retainers or the sōryō and his cadets. Thus the effort of the hard-pressed kokujin class to preserve its holdings worked together with the aggrandizing effort of powerful local magnates to bring into being the true feudal domain of Japan.

Fundamental to this process were developments within the still lower peasant-leader stratum in the provinces. The dogo class, having wrested peasant trusteeships and powers of exploitation over forests, vacant lands, and water from the kokujin, had taken over control of the villages. At the same time, however, conflicts between dogo and ordinary peasants began to surface. To acquire security against such pressure from below, these dogo now approached the kokujin class and, becoming their vassals, emerged as a new class of militarized village chiefs.21 As a consequence, a new hierarchical feudal relationship based on a guarantee of tenure was formed between the kokujin and the dogo. Because the dogo took the initiative in seeking this relationship to secure his domain, the relationship was usually considerably more stable than that between shugo and kokujin. Although these changes took place over time and assumed many forms, the result was the emergence at the beginning of the sixteenth century of a three-tiered feudal hierarchy of sengoku-daimyo, kokujin, and dogo. The provincial domain system of the sengoku-daimyo was thereby created.

The mainstay of the sengoku-daimyo’s control over his domain was the chigyō system, whereby the daimyo had paramount lordship over all land in his domain including the power to confirm fiefs.22 In the Kamakura period, the word chigyō had designated possession of land under a claim of title, and some legal protection was given to this possession. By the sixteenth century, chigyō generally meant possession at the sufferance of higher authority. Through the chigyō system, the daimyo bestowed confirmation on the “original domains” of the kokujin and dogo under his control, invested them with rights of chigyō (chigyō ategai), and granted confirmation of lands already in possession (ichigyō).

20. KM 2–236, Meio 3(1494)/1/19, “Koizumi Motoji keiyaku jōan.”
assigned as military followers to upper ranking retainers. The higher ranking retainer, the yoriyo, was entrusted with the daimyo's power of command over the yoriko.26 The pseudokinship ties on which this new form of organization was based had in all likelihood been established as a substitute for the disintegrating sōryō system. Sengoku-daimyo everywhere employed it in the construction of powerful, large-scale vassal organizations. The position of the dogō in this organizational structure was particularly important. As vassals, they provided military service in time of war. As cultivators in the villages where they lived, they maintained order and collected taxes. Control of the dogō stratum became a critical factor in the daimyo's capacity to control the general peasantry while augmenting the military strength of his domain.

Contributing also to the strength of the sengoku-daimyo was the increased tax revenue which he could command. Access to new sources of tax revenue was achieved when the daimyo successfully converted tensen taxes into an annual impost and incorporated it into the annual ground rent (nengu).27 When the authority to impose tensen shifted from the imperial court to the bakufu, the bakufu delegated the shugo to collect it. Eventually shugo began to levy “shugo tensen” as their own needs dictated, and, as we have seen, this tax became an important source of income for the shugo. By the latter half of the fifteenth century, shugo tensen, which had been levied with increasing frequency, was simply incorporated into the regular annual ground rent. This procedure, in addition to increasing the revenues which could be expected from the daimyo’s domain, also served to give such taxes a more “public” quality. Thus the process of incorporation of tensen into nengu was a distinguishing feature of the sengoku lordship.

Tansen originally had been an extraordinary levy for national purposes, as is shown by the statement “for construction rice for Ise shrine, a tensen of 50 cash per tan of public field.”28 It was calculated on the amount of “public field” in a province and levied in the name of the proprietary sovereign of the country, either emperor or shogun. The amount of public field was presumed to coincide with the field area recorded in provincial registers called tōhō. Since the beginning of the Muromachi period the amount of cognizable public field everywhere decreased steadily and in some provinces ceased to exist.29 The standard for tensen thus became a putative, rather than an actual, amount of public land.

23. CH, 3: "Imagawa kana shikimoku" (legal formulary compiled under Imagawa Yoshihiro circa 1553); 15: “Jinkaishi” (legal formulary compiled under Date Tamezane circa 1536), 100: "Kokki hatto” (legal formulary compiled under Takeda Shingen circa 1557), 12: and "Rokkaku shikimoku” (legal formulary compiled under Rokkaku Yoshiharu and others circa 1567), 10.
25. Ibid.
Daimyō increasingly took advantage of the ambiguity of the public land concept to distribute the tansēn burden over the entire domain. Since it was unclear which parts of his domain were public fields, the lord could distribute his entire tansēn burden over his domain, because for the peasantry the whole domain was the public land of the lord. This practice almost certainly resulted from measures taken on the initiative of the kokujin lords and was already common by the time the sengoku-daimyō came into their own.

In this way, tansēn in the Sengoku period came generally to be levied every year, either on the public fields within domains or on domains in their entirety. The original standard for assessing tansēn was inequitable in that it was based on land area alone, without regard to productivity. As nengū assessments were made on the basis of quality as well as area, the tendency was to change tansēn assessments so as to be proportional to nengū assessments, thereby making the tax more equitable. The sengoku-daimyō, in a word, had come to exact a single tax, of which part was nengū and part was tansēn calculated on the same basis as nengū.

In places where nengū was collected in cash, tansēn would be collected in cash as well, and the combined cash figure assessed became the “cash assessment,” or kandaka. This kandaka figure was used as a basis for calculating the size of chigiyō grants and the consequent military service requirements exacted by daimyō in certain areas such as the Later Hōjō, Takeda, Uesugi, Date, Mōri, and Ōtomo. However, in those areas where nengū was levied in rice, tansēn too was calculated in terms of rice assessment. The total of nengū and tansēn thus calculated became the annual “rice dues” (bummai). But despite these differences in terminology and practice, it is important to recognize that the kandaka system used for chigiyō lands was merely an alternative for “rice dues” and the “rice assessment” system; the evaluation of landholdings on a cash basis was not an essential component of sengoku-daimyō regimes. Far more important for understanding the sengoku-daimyō domain is the fact that the increased revenues of the sengoku-daimyō came from the incorporation of tansēn and other such imposts in nengū.

30. "Setsu no kuni Amakawa mura mizuchō," in TK, 3. A few entries, where area alone was the basis of taxation, record tansēn along with bummai.
32. Ōgami nango. An entry from a survey of Kitasakura no shō in Ōmi dated 1509 reads:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Kikuba</th>
<th>Tansen: 179 cash; rice equivalent, 2 to 7 shō 2 gō</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice dues (bummai): 9 to 11</td>
<td>Dwelling house dues: 5 shō 2 gō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remitted: 1 to 3 shō 5 gō</td>
<td>Fixed rice: 3 to 9 shō 1 gō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service [kōji] rice: 5 shō</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saemon Tarō</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It appears from this that bummai, or “rice dues,” amounting to the sum of the items that follow, was actually a sort of nango of which the older nango, listed here as “fixed rice” (jōmai), was but a part. Tansēn was converted into a rice amount and, with certain other charges, added to the “fixed rice” to produce the final rice assessment.